Kalai and Zemel introduced a class of¯ow-games showing that these games have a non-empty core and that a minimum cut corresponds to a core allocation.
Introduction
Much work has been done in cost and reward sharing, e.g. in network problems and linear production situations, where we minimize costs or maximize rewards.
These problems can be cast into the framework of cooperative games (with side payments): there are three relevant cases in which it is known that these games are balanced (i.e. have a non-empty core).
We are referring in particular to Kalai and Zemel (1982) , Granot and Huberman (1981 and 1984) , Owen (1975) and Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989); a survey is o¨ered in Tijs (1992) . Our main goal is to see whether the balancedness conditions still hold when some of the ®niteness conditions are dropped: this paper considers problems where one of the factors in the problem is countably in®nite (the number of players is always considered to be ®nite).
In particular we deal with the following three questions:
Q1 What can be said about balancedness if there is an in®nite number of arcs in¯ow situations? Q2 What can be said about balancedness if there is an in®nite number of points to be connected to a source at a minimum cost? Q3 What can be said about balancedness if there is an in®nite number of possible products in linear production situations?
It turns out that all these problems give rise (under certain conditions) to balanced games; it is also indicated how to ®nd (approximate) core elements. For Q1, due to the presence of in®nitely many arcs in the network, the problem of max-¯ow and min-cut is not a standard one and we give a set of conditions allowing the non-ambiguous de®nition of a¯ow.
Concerning Q2 we solve the problem not by looking at a minimum spanning tree but by allowing the presence of cycles at low costs.
In Q3 we have the problem of a possible duality gap in semi-in®nite programming. We give su½cient conditions in order that such a gap does not appear and the result is a construction of a core element a Á la Owen.
Also an approximation with ®nite programs is possible.
Basic elements
An n-person game with transferable utility (TU-game) in characteristic form is a couple hNY vi where N f1Y F F F Y ng is the set of players and v X %N 3 R is the characteristic function that assigns to each subset S t N, the value vS that represents the worth of the coalition S; in particular vq 0. When the values assigned to the coalitions represent the cost of the coalition we denote it by cS and call it the cost game hNY ci. For every game hNY vi it is possible to de®ne the corresponding cost game hNY ci, where cS ÀvS. Given a game hNY vi an imputation is a vector x e R n that satis®es the following conditions:
The core of a game hNY vi is the subset of the imputation set that satisfy the following conditions:
i e S x i vS iS t N
